Il a rien inventé du tout:
- déjà sur le plan tactique ses contre offensives à abbeville et Crécy sont très décevantes, surtout pour la première ou il manque d'imagination et se contente de reprendre les axes d'attaque anglais. Mais c'est pas le sujet.
- L'idée d'utilisation en masse du char est dans l'air à cette époque, 'Vers l'armée de métier' n'a rien de révolutionnaire (les généraux Fuller et Estienne* envisagent déjà les armées de Tank en 1919) et son livre représente plus un plaidoyer politique pour une plus grande priorité accordée au char (et une armée professionnelle). Il n'aborde ni l'aspect technique que devrait avoir un bon char, ni l'aspect organisationnel et opérationnel. On est à mille lieux d'un Guderian qui participe à l’élaboration des panzer et de leur doctrine d'emploi (en particulier la radio et la coopération avec la Luftwaffe)et qui commande avec un ccertain brio les divisions panzer ou d'un Isserson (penseur militaire russe) qui imagine avec un degré stupéfiant de réalisme les opérations en profondeur.**
« Imaginez, Messieurs, au formidable avantage stratégique et tactique que prendrait sur les lourdes armées du plus récent passé, cent mille hommes capables de couvrir quatre vingt kilomètres en une seule nuit avec armes et bagages dans une direction et à tout moment. Il suffirait pour cela de huit mille camions ou tracteurs automobiles et de quatre mille chars à chenilles et montés par une troupe de choc de vingt mille hommes. »
Georgii Isserson was a prolific writer on military tactics and operations. Amongst the most important works on operational art were The Evolution of Operational Art (1932 and 1937) and Fundamentals of the Deep Operation (1933). The latter work remains classified to this day.[13]
Isserson concentrated on depth and the role it played in operations and strategy. According to his view strategy had moved on from Napoleonic times and the strategy of a single point (the decisive battle) and the Moltke era of linear strategy. The continuous front that developed in the First World War would not allow the flanking moves of the pre-1914 period. Isserson argued that the front had become devoid of open flanks and military art faced a challenge to develop new methods to break through a deeply echeloned defence. To this end he wrote, "we are at the dawn of a new epoch in military art, and must move from a linear strategy to a deep strategy".[13]
Isserson calculated that the Red Army's attack echelon must be 100 to 120 kilometres long. He estimated that enemy tactical defences, in about two lines would be shallow in the first, stretching back some 5 to 6 kilometres. The Second line would be formed behind and have 12 to 15 kilometres of depth. Beyond this lay the operational depth, this would be larger and more densely occupied than the first, embracing the railheads and supply stations to a depth of 50 to 60 kilometres. Here the main enemy forces were concentrated. The third zone, beyond the operational depth was known as the strategic depth. This zone served as the vital link between the country's manpower reservoirs and industrial power-supply sites and the area of military operations. In this zone lay the headquarters of the strategic forces, which included the Army Group level.[13]
Isserson much like Varfolomeev divided his Shock Armies, one for the task of breaking the enemy forward (or front line defences) and the other to exploit the breakthrough and occupy the operational zone, while destroying enemy reserve concentrations as they attempted to counter the assault. The exploitation phase would be carried out by combined arms teams of mechanized airborne infantry and motorised forces.[14]
The breadth of the attack zone was an important factor in Soviet calculations. Isserson asserted an attack over a frontage of 70 to 80 kilometres would be best. Three or four Rifle Corps would make a breakthrough along a front of 30 kilometres. The breakthrough zone (only under favourable conditions) might be expanded to 48 to 50 kilometres with another Rifle Corps. Under these conditions, a Rifle Corps would attack along a 10 to 12 kilometre front, with each division in the Corps' first echelon allocated a 6 kilometre frontage. A fifth supporting Rifle Corps would make diversionary attacks along the flanks of the main thrust to tie down counter responses, confuse the enemy as to the area of the main thrust and delay his reserves from arriving.[14]
